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September will be the first real 
opportunity to do so. This means that, 
over the coming months, unions will 
have to test the new principles to the_ 
limit in an effort to achieve gains 
beyond the S10 a week mark.
Some unions will abide by the 
decision, their leadership unable 
and/or unwilling to offer any 
challenge to the government or 
management in their  m em bers ’ 
industries. The most contentious area 
will be the provision for increases of up 
to four percent under the new 
“restructuring and efficiency” prin­
ciple , or modified work value 
principle.
The new principle is designed to 
leave many workers “on the shelf’ in 
terms of wage movements unless they 
are in strong bargaining positions or 
can engage in a militant industrial 
campaign with serious prospects of 
success. It is also another signal of the 
end of the Accord, since it ties wage 
fixation to industry development — 
two matters dealt with separately 
under the Accord. And, by limiting 
additional increases to workers 
directly involved in technology and 
work methods changes, it seeks to 
divide workers and unions.
The commission also clearly 
favours enterprise level negotiations, 
in order to weaken unions'traditional 
concerns to deal with the interests of 
all workers across particular sections 
of industry.
The trade union movement is 
without doubt in for a difficult period. 
The d o m in a n t  e c o n o m ic  and  
ideological approach of the ACTU 
leadership is in line with the worst of 
Australian labourist traditions. It 
perceives the working class and trade 
unions as being almost entirely 
dependent on the developmental 
processes of capitalism, and as 
necessarily being compliant with its 
demands and profit needs. This 
position is challenged somewhat by 
communists, socialists and others in 
trade union leadership, but they are 
not influential enough to reverse or 
moderate the existing trends, except in 
isolated areas of the movement.
The commission’s decision will 
further impoverish hundreds of 
thousands of Australians, and may 
precipitate further economic crises
through under-consumption and over­
production. Any attempt to reverse 
this decline in living stnadards will 
require a reassessment of overall trade 
union strategy, and this needs to be 
argued for from the shop floor to the 
official level in all unions.
T ra d e  u n io n s  rem a in  the  
principal base for organised responses 
by Australian workers in defence of 
their interests, and this role needs to be 
reasserted in the period ahead.
Warwick Neittey
A fte r C o ry ’s C onstitu tion
Twelve months after the February “revolution” in the Philippines, Cory Aquino has won a 
landslide victory in the vote on her 
Constitution and, more directly, for 
her presidency until 1992. She has 
been lionised as “Time’s (Wo) Man of 
the Year” and become the idol of 
western politicians, the mass media 
and of many who wish the Philippines 
only well.
With such near-unan im ous 
world-wide endorsement, one would 
t h i n k  t h a t  C o r y ’s t a s k  in  
reconstructing the Philippines after 14 
years of the most savage rape by the 
Marcos clan and its cronies would be 
now well under way. But the Filipino 
people know differently. Unemploy­
ment and poverty have escalated 
greatly in the past year. Children are 
now dying of starvation on Negros and 
infant mortality remains high.
The generous praise heaped on 
Aquino by the USA has not been 
matched by a generosity in economic 
aid. On the contrary, the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund 
have tightened the screws. With the 
en thusias tic  su p p o r t  of C o ry ’s 
economic ministers , handpicked  
for their monetarism, the IM F and 
World Bank have demanded and won 
even further economic “liberalis­
a t io n ” . P ro tection ism  is being 
dismantled and today the USA and 
EEC (and Australia) can dump even 
their surplus rice stocks at below-cost 
prices in the Philippines. It is ironic 
that, as protectionist barriers are 
raised in the advanced capitalist 
countries against Filipino imports, 
these same countries righteously 
demand that the Philippines lower its 
trade defences.
T h e  A q u i n o  g o v e r n m e n t  
continues the same policies as Marcos 
in relying on agriculture and having no 
concept of industrialisation. In the 
name of dismantling the monopolies, 
Marcos handed over to his family and 
cronies, the Aquino government is 
proceeding with a rapid privatisation 
of the economy. And the cronies’ 
monopolies are being sold off to 
Japanese and UN investors at bargain 
basement rates, being offset against 
the country’s huge overseas debt.
With about 60 percent of the 
country’s exports going simply to 
service that international debt, the 
whole nation is caught in a modern 
form of debt slavery. Aquino’s 
ministers have insisted on a better 
deal, along the lines won last year by 
Mexico, for repayment of the debt, but 
have come up against a brick wall of 
the biggest US banks. In the longer 
t e r m ,  t h i s  s u b s e r v i e n c e  to  
international capita! and the failure 
even to contemplate an industrial­
isation program will be the downfall of 
the Aquino regime, and of the neo­
colonial system.
The Philippines is but one of the 
many Third World nations which 
desperately need a new "Marshall 
Plan”. In the case of the Philippines, 
such a multi-billion rescue plan alone 
can stop or substantially halt the rapid 
progress of the revolutionary forces. 
Such a “Marshall Plan” therefore is 
the logical way for imperialism to save 
the country from revolutionary 
change. Yet there are many factors 
which impede such a rescue operation, 
above all, the danger such an example 
would set elsewhere. There is also the 
ev e r -p re se n t  d an g e r  th a t  any 
annulment of the international debt.
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or even giving substantial concessions 
on the debt, could bring the whole 
house of cards crashing down.
The related question of land 
reform is perhaps the most immediate 
one facing Aquino. The international 
media, and her close adviser Cardinal 
Sin, are unanimous in calling for real 
action on this front. After all, land 
reform is not contradictory to 
capitalist development: indeed, it is 
essential for it. Aquino would only 
carry out a token land reform, with 
s u b s t a n t i a l  c o m p e n s a t i o n  to  
landlords. To finance that, her 
e c o n o m ic s  m in i s t e r s  r e c e n t ly  
approached the World Bank for 
SUS500 million. The bank refused and 
now Aquino must go cap in hand to 
the Asian Development Bank,
essentially Japan. The Japanese 
economy is awash with money, yet its 
rulers are as parsimonious as ever. 
D u r in g  the  Ja p a n e se  F o re ig n  
Minister’s recent, much-publicised 
visit to the South Pacific, the 
Australian media predicted very 
generous Japanese loans to South 
Pacific island nations. In fact, Japan 
gave a miserable $6 million to the 
South Pacific, and has shown no signs 
of generosity to the Philippines.
In such a situation, the Aquino 
government remains very much within 
the grip of US domination. Internally, 
it is emerging as a typical pre-Marcos 
regime, building its networks of local 
bosses (many of them ex-Marcos 
converts) into an electoral machine 
closely linked with the privileged and
powerful. And, as in the 'fifties and 
’sixties, the President engages in crude 
pork-barrelling, extravagant promises 
and not a tittle demagogy about 
democracy.
The Philippines left, after the 
experience of the two-month ceasefire 
ana the referendum is now evaluating 
a year of Aquino rule and its future 
evolution. The underground left 
grouped in the National Democratic 
Front, and the major above-ground 
left in the unions (KMU — May First 
M o v em en t)  and  the P easan ts  
Movement (KMP), are united in 
seeing the “ p r in c ip a l  c o n t r a ­
diction” as between the “people 
and reaction” — with Aquino very 
much in the camp of reaction. A 
minority both in the NDF and 
particularly in the urban-based above­
ground left, see the principal 
contradiction as that between fascism 
and the people— in which Aquino is 
defined as an anti-fascist.
The danger of a “fascist" coup 
remains, although much lessened now 
compared with previous months. The 
Aquino government remains unable to 
control the military or prevent it from 
m assacring and brutalis ing  the 
peasantry, among whom support for 
the NDF is now widespread. Aquino 
and her army chief General Ramos are 
united in seeking, by all and any 
means, to destroy the revolutionary 
forces. In this they are at one with the 
Pentagon strategists who advocate 
"Low Intensity Conflict” (LIC).
The LIC strategy does not mean less 
bodies on the ground, but it does seek 
to make the bodies more clearly 
defined as the “enemy" It means also a 
much more “political" war and the 
construction of grassroots repression, 
building “anti-communist” militia in 
each barrio and shanty town to work 
with the military in "weeding out” the 
“communists", selectively rather than 
by arbitrary massacres. LIC requiresa 
more sophisticated, politically active 
military which is also able to provide 
some "civic action” benefits to those 
peasants and shanty dwellers who co­
operate, and a certainty of harsh 
punishment if they do not.
Inevitably, it is the lumpen 
elements, the criminals and psychotics 
who become the spearhead of the
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“anti-communist militia". Under 
Marcos, such gangs — the Civilian 
Home Defence Force (CHDF) — 
operated as paramilitary auxiliaries 
and were among the most notorious 
for human rights violations. They 
remain untouched under Aquino. But 
the C H D F is no ta  model for LIC, not 
least because it exists separately from 
the people in army barracks. Other 
anti-communist gangs, including the 
recently created Alsa Masa in Davao 
City, Mindanao, are criminal gangs 
under another name, despite their 
claimed success and recruitment of 
former New People's Army guerrillas. 
Critical to the success of L1C is a 
“democratic” facade, with a civilian 
president speaking the language of 
reform. Napoleon Duarte in El 
Salvador is a good example of the type 
of figure the US LIC strategy requires. 
While Aquino is not yet fully absorbed 
into the Duarte image, she is on the 
way to becoming so.
The Philippines military, on the 
admission of Aquino’s Defence 
Minister lleto, is incompetent, poorly- 
disciplined and unsophisticated, and 
not a suitable instrument for apply:i.p 
the LIC strategy. In the provinces, it 
operates as a mafia, leading most 
criminal activities and extorting local 
businesses and peasants alike. If 
Aquino won a landslide endorsement 
in the referendum, it was essentially a 
vote for her liberal democratic trends 
against the military-in-place which is 
rightly identified as fascist. If the vote 
had been between the ND F and the 
military, then the landslide would have 
been for the NDF.
Thus, while the popularity and still- 
high hopes which the masses have of 
Aquino undoubtedly pose a problem 
for the NDF, it does not lessen their 
grassroots support in the face of the 
military and corrupt local bosses. T he 
Aquino problem is much more acute 
for the NDF among the urban “middle 
forces” — the professionals, the office 
workers and small business people 
who, although small in proportion 
to the population, wield great 
influence. It is a sign of the strength of 
the revolutionary forces that they now 
place great importance on their work 
among the “middle forces” almost to 
the point of preoccupation. The 
grassroots work among the peasants
and worker masses continues, but the 
challenge is to assemble their “allies” 
among the middle forces. These 
middle forces in turn can help the 
armed struggle reach a new phase, 
given their access to skills which are 
sorely needed.
The NDF participation in the 
ceasefire was, in large part, directed to 
the need to reach these middle forces, 
and was often reluctantly accepted in 
the guerrilla zones for that reason 
alone. It is equally significant that it is 
the left working among the middle 
forces which generally sees fascism as
th e  p r in c ip a l  s o u rc e  o f  the 
contradiction in Filipino politics. The 
NDF and the revolutionary left in the 
Philippines as a whole represents the 
most dynamic and sophisticated force 
in Asia today. Its internal democracy 
is impressive, while its flexibility in 
relation to tactics combines with 
a firmness of principle which has 
inspired many who have witnessed it. 
Imputations that it is the ”new Khmer 
Rouge” are gross and even laughable.
Denis Freney
